@The Wizard Between the Ctrl-Right Neo Nazi shock troops and the Toxic Identitarian Centrist Enablers for corporate welfare, our voice will be almost certainly drowned out. And that's before the militarized rent-a-cops come and brutalize us and Dipshit Trumpsterfire makes some inane speech about 'all sides' sharing the blame.

There are idiots out there who actually believe that the Democratic Party tried to work with Occupy Wall Street when the truth was the exact opposite. And don't forget how Breitbart and other neocon rags published false stories about rape and violence, the agent provocateurs who tried to turn everyone against each other including the Liberturds led by Peter Schiff...It goes on and on.

Even if no military action takes place (better not) the world needs to know that the people of the US do not agree with the threat of the use of military force at every turn. Big Al is right, if they even thought that they could get away with it they would level the DPRK, again.

@riverlover

he will be his excellent friend, Kim.

and often does. Or will not recall giving that Dog-awful speech. Other than "owning" a building across the street.

I would agree to Dump Trump as long as HRC does not slither in.

@Steven D

Down the Road: 1962 and 1963

The U.S. was far ahead in the arms race. Yet the military continued to press for a rapid build-up of strategic missiles. Curtis LeMay had asked for at least 2400 Minutemen; Thomas Powers of the Strategic Air Command had asked for 10,000. All were to be unleashed in a single paroxysm of mass annihilation, know as SIOP, the Single Integrated Operating Plan.

SIOP was a recipe for blowing up the world, whether in a first or a second strike. [...]

During that summer of 1961, the Defense Secretary ordered an overhaul of SIOP carried out by RAND analysts (including Daniel Ellsberg) and quickly approved by the JCS. Kennedy and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara eventually imposed a limit of 1,000 Minuteman missiles, angering the Chiefs. Kennedy also launched efforts to gain operational control of the nuclear force, then far from being securely concentrated in the President's hands.

The Burris memorandum may help to explain both the military's drive for a vast U.S. nuclear build-up, despite the fact that America was already far ahead, and the resistance from JFK and McNamara. The Net Evaluation Subcommittee had offered the Pentagon, the CIA, and President Kennedy a glimpse of the opportunity that lay ahead in the winter of 1963: U.S. nuclear superiority so complete that a first strike might be successful. But it also alerted Kennedy to a danger. American nuclear superiority might then be so complete, that rogue elements from the military and intelligence forces, seeking to precipitate an American first strike, might not feel deterred by fear of Soviet retaliation. What was the dispute over the numbers of land-based ICBMs really about? To be sure, at some level it involved the sufficiency of deterrence. But there may also have been an even graver concern: the offensive capabilities of the nuclear force, at a time when the President could not be sure of his control over the nuclear button.

Air Force General Curtis Lemay, while member of the JCS under JFK advocated for a first strike against the Soviet Union. He was dead serious, and there were many other generals that supported him.

http://prospect.org/article/did-us-military-plan-nuclear-first-strike-1963

But beginning in 1957 the U.S. military did prepare plans for a preemptive nuclear strike against the U.S.S.R., based on our growing lead in land-based missiles. And top military and intelligence leaders presented an assessment of those plans to President John F. Kennedy in July of 1961. At that time, some high Air Force and CIA leaders apparently believed that a window of outright ballistic missile superiority, perhaps sufficient for a successful first strike, would be open in late 1963. [...]

Later in 1961, a National Intelligence Estimate came through showing only four Soviet ICBMs in place, all of them on low alert at a test site called Plesetsk. By fall, Defense Undersecretary Roswell Gilpatric would acknowledge in a public speech that U.S. forces (with 185 ICBMs and over 3,400 deliverable nuclear bombs at that time) were vastly superior to those of the Russians. [...]

The Burris Memorandum

The memorandum reproduced here was written for Vice President Lyndon Johnson, who did not attend the [meeting of the National Security Council on July 20, 1961], by Colonel Howard Burris, his military aide. Declassified only in June of 1993, it has not previously received any public attention so far as we have been able to determine.

The first paragraph introduces General Hickey and his group, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. Although the subcommittee report is described as "annual," this would be the first one given to President Kennedy and his advisors, and it is not clear whether President Eisenhower received such reports in person. General Lyman Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, stepped in to explain the "assumption" of the 1961 report: "a surprise attack in late 1963, preceded by a period of heightened tensions." The question arises: A surprise attack by whom on whom?

The following paragraphs answer the question. The second paragraph reports that after hearing the presentations, President Kennedy asked the presenters "if there had ever been made an assessment of damage results to the U.S.S.R. which would be incurred by a preemptive attack." Kennedy also asked for an effectiveness trend since "these studies have been made since 1957." Lemnitzer responded that he would later answer both of the President's questions in private.

Paragraph three records Kennedy asking a hypothetical question: what would happen if we launched a strike in the winter of 1962? Allen Dulles of the CIA responded that "the attack would be much less effective since there would be considerably fewer missiles involved." Lemnitzer then cautioned against putting too much faith in the findings since the assumptions might be faulty. The discussion thus provides a time-frame. December of 1962 was too early for an attack because the U.S. would have too few missiles; by December of 1963 there would likely be sufficient numbers.

They also wanted to use tactical nukes against Cuba in the Cuban Missile Crisis.

After low-level surveillance flights photographed nuclear-capable short-range rockets in Cuba (known as FROGs in the West and as Luna to the Soviets), military commanders in charge of invasion planning requested authorization to plan for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara denied that request.