"The enemy has got a face. He's called Satan. He's in Falluja. And we're going to destroy him."
- Lt Col Gary Brandl

In early April 2004, the United States Army assaulted Fallujah in Operation Vigilant Resolve. 27 soldiers died in what became a stalemate.
Seven months later the United States launched Operation Phantom Fury against Fallujah. 95 Americans died, plus 12 British and Iraqi allies. Thousands of civilians died as well.
36,000 of the city's 50,000 homes were destroyed, along with 60 schools and 65 mosques and shrines.

In the summer of 2007, U.S. forces working directly with Iraqi forces in Operation Alljah managed to take back the neighborhoods of Fallujah from al-Qaeda. 6 more Americans were killed.

A few days ago, 20,000 Iraqi troops backed by U.S. air power and advisors, began yet another assault on Fallujah.
Few are questioning whether U.S. and Baghdad forces can take Fallujah. The question is what is the point?

the question is not whether the US and its allies will win in Fallujah — they always do. The real question is whether it will finally matter. As the latest battle for Fallujah commences, the taking and retaking of the city has become a symbol of the utter pointlessness of US efforts in Iraq.
...the US and its allies have won all of their previous battles for Fallujah. And although the US will only be playing a supporting role this time around, it should be successful as well. The US military is an incredibly effective learning organization and every time it retakes the city of Fallujah, it gets better at it.

The Architect: You are here because Zion is about to be destroyed. Its every living inhabitant terminated, its entire existence eradicated.

Neo: Bull****

The Architect: Denial is the most predictable of all human responses. But, rest assured, this will be the sixth time we have destroyed it, and we have become exceedingly efficient at it.

The problem is what happens once ISIS is gone and the Iraqi government takes over. In 2013, the city's Sunni residents revolted against the central government in Baghdad because of its sectarian oppression. From their perspective, the Iraqi government under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had begun a systematic oppression of the Sunnis, focused on purging the security forces of Sunnis and arresting leading Sunni politicians.

Today, there is a new, gentler government in Baghdad. It is financially and militarily weak and has made encouraging moves toward decentralization of power and reconciliation with the Sunnis and Kurds. But is still dominated by Shia, it still relies on fiercely sectarian Shia militias for its military strength, and it has failed to achieve any sort of reconciliation with Iraq’s Sunnis.

Without any progress on reconciliation, the Sunnis and Shia in Iraq will continue to see each other at existential enemies. The Iraqi central government, which depends on Iran and various Shia militia for its survival, will not drift naturally toward an inclusive policy.

Indeed, as the Iraqi central government recovers its strength on the back of loans from international financial institutions and US military support, it will likely return to its old efforts at repression. ISIS, as it loses territory, is cooperating in this evolution by resorting to its old strategy of reinforcing the sectarian dynamic in Iraq through a campaign of bombings in Baghdad.

We can destroy Fallujah. We will destroy Fallujah. We have destroyed Fallujah.
If destroying Fallujah was our primary objective then we should continue with our present course.

But if peace and prosperity is our objective then we need to rethink everything.