Vladimir Vladimirovich has some opinions regarding the outcome of this faux election.

The author of parts of this essay are by Sergei Markov, who runs a pro-Kremlin think tank in Moscow and is the deputy head of the international cooperation committee in the Civic Chamber.

"They [the American people] see that Russian television praises Trump and trashes Clinton. They do this because Trump says nice things about Russia. But the government position is very different from the TV's because it understands that it's just words now. And that when the election is over, we will have to deal not with whoever is president but with the American system."

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Emphasis mine.

Even more importantly, Putin will have shown himself to be able to project power far beyond where anyone would have suspected. It's no longer just in his backyard, like in Georgia and Ukraine — not even in the Middle East. Putin is now able to bring his tactics of asymmetric warfare deep into the belly of his greatest foe, the world's last superpower.

The two subsequently linked articles take issue with that statement. But see below.

If Trump wins:

"If Trump wins, of course they'll drink champagne in the Kremlin, but not for long," says former Putin advisor and political analyst Gleb Pavlovsky. "Then they'll realize that nothing is resolved and that the election of Trump will lead to more chaos. But that's what we're selling — chaos."

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Emphasis mine.

If Clinton wins:

If Clinton wins, Putin won't mind that he'll be dealing with a president who had to climb over a mountain of Kremlin propaganda and interference to get to the White House. Bitter? Fine. But at least you'll know that we're stronger than you thought. "How can it be a regional power if it was the central topic of the third debate?" Markov asks.

Clinton's hawkishness toward Moscow, and her bad blood with Putin, is not necessarily a bad thing for Russia. She will continue proving a convenient foil, the image of a warmongering United States bent on humiliating Russia. On a political, practical level, she's a known quantity.

"She's just a continuation of a trend," Markov says. "When she was secretary of state, you couldn't call her an extremist." Her presidency would just mean more of the same stagnant standoff between Moscow and Washington.

It is with that last sentence that I have great difficulty. If the Mad Bomber wasn't an extremist, what would Mr. Markov think would be more extreme--maybe dropping a few nukes?

And the real gem in this article:

"Moscow understands that the level of unpredictability in American politics is going up in any case," Markov says. Trump is anti-establishment and unpredictable, and "Clinton will be under constant threat of impeachment, and she will be forced to overcome this challenge. Plus, she's very hysterical. … Both will be in conflict with Congress, which is good," Markov says. "Let them focus on domestic politics. The less they focus on foreign policy, the better for the rest of the world."

But is Russia really that powerful? Note that this video focusses on European Russia. Russia apparently lacks the infrastructure to use it's large Pacific Ocean access to advantage. The video also minimizes Russian plethora of natural resources. By developing the Asian part of Russia, admittedly a formidable task, would over the long run, be of great economic advantage to them. In order to do so, they would have devote the military share of GDP into infrastructure. This would be a long process due to the relatively poor Russian economy and the vast expanses of relatively barren territory to be traversed--but the potential is there.

If Russia is considering such a scheme, then the outcome of the U.S. election either way plays into the plan:
1. If Trump is elected, he will devote most of his efforts to economic affairs, hopefully including infrastructure.
2. If the Mad Bomber wins, she will be stalemated by a House of Representatives Republican majority which will "hold her feet to the fire" as much or more than they did with Obama.

A fascinating geopolitical analysis of Russia is well worth reading for the interesting perspectives and informative maps it presents.

But as you can tell from these maps, the key country for Russia after 1991 was Ukraine. The Baltics were beyond reach for now, and Belarus had a pro-Russian government. But either way, Ukraine was the key, because the Ukrainian border went through Russia’s agricultural heartland, as well as large population centers and transportation networks.

It should be noted that the area that the Russians defend most heavily is the area just west of the Russian border, buying as much space as they can.

The fact that this scenario leaves Russia in a precarious position means that the Russians are unlikely to leave the Ukrainian question where it is. Russia does not have the option of assuming that the West’s interest in the region comes from good intentions.

Finally there is a point which needs further explication:

Russia does not have the ability to project significant force because its naval force is bottled up and because you cannot support major forces from the air alone. Although it became involved in the Syrian conflict to demonstrate its military capabilities and gain leverage with the West, this operation is peripheral to Russia’s main interests. The primary issue is the western frontier and Ukraine. In the south, the focus is on the Caucasus.

The key phrase here is "project power". This both true and false. True in that projection of power distant from its landmass would be difficult absent a modern carrier-based battle group. But false because in these days of missiles ranging from mortars to ICBMs Russia would not have difficulty fighting a "conventional" (i.e., non-nuclear) war to expand its direct control into geographically contiguous lands. The Russian military is not to be scoffed at.

On the psychologic front, the following is worth considering, thoroughly digesting the following concept:

Thucydides distinguished between Athens and Sparta by pointing out that Athens was close to the sea and had an excellent port, Piraeus. Sparta, on the other hand, was not a maritime power. Athens was much wealthier than Sparta. A maritime power can engage in international trade in a way that a landlocked power cannot.

Therefore, the Athenian is wealthy, but in that wealth there are two defects. First, wealth creates luxury and luxury corrupts. Second, wider experience in the world creates moral ambiguity.

Sparta enjoyed far less wealth than Athens. It was not built through trade but through hard labor. And thus, it did not know the world, but instead had a simple and robust sense of right and wrong.

Thucydides distinguished between Athens and Sparta by pointing out that Athens was close to the sea and had an excellent port, Piraeus. Sparta, on the other hand, was not a maritime power. Athens was much wealthier than Sparta. A maritime power can engage in international trade in a way that a landlocked power cannot.

Therefore, Russia can’t be Athens. It must be Sparta, and that means it must be a land power and assume the cultural character of a Spartan nation. Russia must have tough if not sophisticated troops fighting ground wars. It must also be able to produce enough wealth to sustain its military as well as provide a reasonable standard of living for its people—but Russia will not be able to match Europe in this regard.

The take home message from all this is that by reordering its priorities, developing its far east Asian territory and obtaining better access to exploitation and transport of natural resources, Russia can overcome several important handicaps.

Don't poke the Bear.